Why is a Coach Visiting Iraq Important?

These days, Texas A&M Head Footbal Coach Mike Sherman isn't much of a household name. Back when my team was winning in the late-nineties, he was coaching in the NFL. A lot of people are still wondering just who the hell the guy is after he replaced savior-turned-homewrecker Dennis Franchione.

Sherman's two seasons coaching the Aggies are remarkable only in their ability to continually confuse and frustrate our fanbase.

Disclaimer: I'm an Aggie.

So, when I got word he took the time this last week to visit with Soldiers in Iraq, two words came to mind:

Thanks, Mike.

Iraq is slowly fading from the American public's rearview mirror, and that's a good thing. For years, the only news on Iraq was negative. It was viewed by a good chunk of our national leadership as a lost cause that should have been abandoned for the good of all. But you don't hear that anymore.

The protests have died down. The finger pointing has mostly ended. It means things are going well for Iraq and its people. Violence continues to decrease and our presence in the country continues to decline. Soldiers in Iraq don't appear in the headlines as often as they used to. Regardless of who claims the credit (or blame), it feels good to be a victim of our own success.

It was nice to see my school's headcoach visit Iraq for no other reason than thank the Soldiers who worked so hard to turn the country around. He shared some words of wisdom with those who would listen, and listen they did. I especially liked the part of the Longhorn officer taking notes.

So what? Why address the visit of a little-know coach's visit to an area where the war is gradually coming to a close?

Because we're still there.

As we get closer to Memorial Day weekend, the national holiday where we Americans honor our men and women who died while in military service, take a moment and offer your thoughts and support to our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines still in harm's way. Just because we're winning doesn't mean life is back to normal for them or their families. Casualties are always inevitable, and before it ends, more of our Soldiers will perish. Our families back home will still struggle with the anxiety and stress of brought by seperation and protracted conflict.

Until we're all back home together.

Sitting Around a Map

Another crowded, smoke-filled room with forty or so people gathered around another long table with a projector at the end throw up a picture of a map on a too-small screen. From my position, the whiny fan on the aged Canon digital projector obscures the voices coming from the other end of the long, rectangular room.

Today at the command center, many of the provincial players from nearby Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) gathered at our weekly meeting. Normally used to discuss the previous weeks SIGACTS, or Significant Actions, the agenda from this week was to highlight the impact of the ISF ongoing turf wars. Now, these are not turf wars where one group encroaches on the territory of another. The problem here is ISF units in our areas are hesitant to engage outside of their given Area of Responsibility.

The cloud hanging over the table is the assassination of another influential sheik the previous night. The enemy, conveniently dubbed as al Quada, uses a policy to alienate the highly successful Sons of Iraq contracted-militias from ISF and Coalition Forces. The strategy is clear; alienate the people from the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces by attacking a linchpin of Coalition support.

Areas of Operations, or Areas of Responsibility, are pieces of land handed to us by our higher headquarters with the intent of preventing conflicting operations between friendly forces. In a perfect world, all the Areas would bump up against each other to provide maximum coverage to throughout the province. However, this is not a perfect world, and the Areas do not bump up against each other.

As each representative from the Iraqi Army, various Iraqi Police departments, and the National Police go to the map and draw their Areas, it become apparent that there are 1) a lot of overlapping areas and 2) a lot of gaps with no one claiming responsibility. Not surprisingly, the murder of the influential sheik happened in one of these gaps.

Also not surprising, is the use of these areas as enemy safe havens. Overlapping areas of responsibility appear to be in cities and on major highways. The gaps and enemy safe havens appear among rural areas and agricultural communities, well off the beaten path and difficult to access with the Coalition new, larger IED-resistant MRAP vehicles. By looking at reports of enemy activity and traffic through the province, we see that our enemy knows where the gaps are and is exploiting them to his advantage.

This is changing. All the professionals around the table now look at the map and see themselves hamstrung by poorly coordinated lines arbitrarily drawn on a map without much consideration for history or the enemy. The Coalition Force commander quoted Sun Tzu when he called this first step, "seeing ourselves."

Our next step is to take our maps and gaps and identify the enemy, his patterns, and his networks. This is called, "seeing the enemy." This includes sharing intelligence in a country where mishandling your 'source' could get someone killed. That portion will probably prove difficult given the turbulent history of distrust between the different Iraqi Security Force entities. Sharing will be a challenge.

We'll cross that bridge when we get there.

Sons of Iraq

Last week, my team travelled to Tikrit to sit in on a transition meeting between the Iraqi Army, Coalition Forces and contractors representing almost 10,000 Sons of Iraq contractors from our province. On March 1, the process for transition supervision and responsibility for Sons of Iraq (SOI) formally begins in the Salah ah Din province. There are over 2,000 alone in my area, and over the next several months, the Prime Minister ordered all to transition to the employ of either the Ministry of Defense or Interior (Army or Police) or to a position somewhere with the Government of Iraq.

So who are these Sons of Iraq guys? Listening to some, you would believe that a good deal of these individuals where the guys we fought pre-Surge, back in 2005-2006. There is a good deal of truth to that. For young men trying to put food on the table for their family, they based their roles as insurgents almost as much on economic opportunity as they did idealism. Now they are beneficiaries of Iraq’s National Reconciliation Program. Formerly, the insurgents and terrorists were among the few available employers to young Iraqi males.

Enter the Surge and the Sons of Iraq. Part of any decent counterinsurgency, is figuring out how to convince insurgents to lay down their arms and take up jobs. The brilliance of the Sons of Iraq is that now you let them to do both. Hundreds of thousands of Sons of Iraq took their weapons and under the guidance and supervision of Coalition Forces, boldly stepped into their new roles of providing security to the people of Iraq.

Many of them, who were part of the problem, became part of the solution. Together, they provided security coverage far into areas of Iraq where Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Army did not. The fought insurgents bravely, sometimes in spite of themselves, and ultimately many sacrificed their lives in the name of the Iraqi People.

Not all SoI were part of the insurgency that swept across Iraq. Many are hard working Iraqis taking advantage of classic economic theory. We had a demand for security, many of those young men stepped in to fill it. Some came from the other side as part of reconciliation, but most were just looking for jobs.

Back to this week, many were represented in that room in Tikrit. Their sheiks were there to receive a briefing from the Iraqi Division Commander and provincial Governor on the details of the transfer. When they opened the floor to questions, there were many: Complaints of inconsistent pay; unfulfilled promises from Coalition Forces; logistical support; compensation for fallen SoI. The sheiks asked hard questions and unfortunately, there were few answers.

Cameras lined both sides of the meeting room. Interviews conducted after the meeting indicated high degrees of both hope and pessimism. There is no question that the SoI were part of the formula that greatly reduced the violence. Some were argue that they were THE critical part.

The mission now is transitioning them over the Iraqi military control. It will not be easy. Our Iraqi counterparts have difficulty dealing with their own pay and administration. Now we will gradually load thousands of additional SoI and their related issues on the shoulders of the Iraqi Army.

Our counterparts appear to be up to the challenge. In the last week, they worked late into the night to come up with a plan to focuses on integrating control of the Sons of Iraq into our brigade, while emphasizing the treatment of SoI with dignity and respect. The latter is a difficult task, not so long ago many of the IA and SoI were on opposite lines of the counterinsurgency campaign.

Now, the leadership see the SoI as an extension of their operational reach, capable of providing additional security and intelligence to the Iraqi Army. This will be our most important mission over the next several months. So far, all is well. Personally, I want to see all the SoI integrated into their new positions within the Iraqi Security Forces or government employ. Count me in the crowd that does not want to see them cross back over to the other side.

Mending Fences

The Army is not all Kevlar and testosterone. Over the years I have come to the realization that people, not tanks and helicopters, make the Army go. Of course, it's the same as in the civilian world. You have to work with people in order to accomplish your objectives.

Over the last week, we had two objectives. First, we had to get out into our battle space and find where we fit in the grand scheme of things. Just tackling the weekly rhythm alone was a daunting task. There were meetings scattered all over the calendar and the map.

We quickly realized was that with a small, geographically isolated team you could not get everywhere for every meeting. If we did, we would spend all our time on the road going to meetings rather than performing our primary duty: advising an Iraqi Infantry Brigade.

That process is still ongoing. We're whittling the large list of meetings down to a few. We're figuring out where we need to plug in to maximize our effects. It'll be another couple of weeks, but it should pay off for us in the long run. The important part is trying to find the right forum for connection our Iraqi and Coalition counterparts. That's the key to success and will require additional work.

Our other objective was to get out and work on relationships. Before coming here, we were told that our primary problem would be lack of support from coalition partners In other words, don't bother asking for help because none will come.

The reality we discovered was very different. Coalition units have bent over backwards to provide the support needed for us to execute our mission. The primary difference between what I'll categorize as 'then-and-now' is simply personalities. We've made it a point of emphasis to get out there and shake hands with units throughout our area of operations. Already, the payoff is huge.

It is yet another reminder that an e-mail is never as good as a phone call or a handshake. Oh, and that you get more with sugar than salt.

Election Day

Yesterday was a great day.

For the past week, out RIP/TOA focused on integrating our new team with our Iraqi counterparts and preparing for the 31 January Provincial Elections. The Iraqi and Coalition Forces managed to exceed all expectations in providing safe voting locations for the Iraqi people to come and practice their freedoms. For weeks in the region, enemy insurgent activity has been on the decline. There were two schools of thought on why.

First, pressure on the insurgents is intense. In the weeks up to the elections Iraqi and Coalition Forces continually applied pressure throughout our region. Coalition patrols and a huge amount of checkpoints run by the Iraqi Army and Sons of Iraq denied insurgents freedom of movement throughout the sector.

Second, most of our experts predicted that the downturn in violence was a tactic by insurgents to save up for large, attention getting strikes against the coalition and populace on election day. It made sense. Given the pressure placed on insurgent by Coalition and Iraqi forces, the natural assumption was that insurgent would be desperate for attention and go for the big election day hit.

What was my team's role in all this? After all, we were only on the ground for one week. This time, we were the observers. We integrated ourselves with our Iraqi counterparts. We checked and double checked their preparations. We coordinated with our Coalition counterparts throughout the region to ensure that everyone was on the same sheet of music.

When election day came, we watched, and we prayed.

Nothing happened. There were reports of a few small incidents regarding celebratory gunfire, but on whole, it was a rather quiet day. As the clock ticked, we bit our lip and held on. Everyone waited by the radio, waiting for a report from a polling station of a monstrous attack. Coalition and Iraqi Quick Reaction Forces stood by, ready to handle the worst.

The worst never came. The Iraqi people again pointed their signature ink-dipped fingers in the air, again showing a sign of victory and defiance. We still hold our breath, waiting for that big, attention-grabbing attack. Waiting for someone to break the quiet. When it comes, our Iraqi counterparts are ready, and we will be there alongside them.

Again, yesterday, was a great day.

RIP/TOA

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) is the process where one coalition unit takes the place of another. Over the next several days, each member of the team will spend his time following around his counterpart trying to absorb everything that was accomplished over the last year, as well as the mundane stuff such as admin, reports, etc...

We had an initial dinner with the IA (Iraqi Army) brigade executive officer. It was an informal sit down dinner where both teams had the opportunity to dine at the Iraqi officer's mess. Not all our IA counterparts were present. Mine was currently unavailable so I will have to wait until another time. Their manning is run different than ours. The either live with the unit, or with their family. Because of the danger to them and their family, the two do not mix. They will spend a few weeks living on the base, then quietly slip out to return to their family.

Once we have the systems in place, it will still take quite a bit of time to gain a complete understanding of our new surroundings. The Iraqis place a high degree of value in personal relationships. Relationships take time. Right now the old team enters a room and receives the full embrace from the IA chain of command. Currently, we merit only a handshake. We will earn that trust over time with sweat.

RIP/TOA is not the only thing going on. Lower in priority, we're working through the amenities portion of our new surroundings. Currently I'm in the MWR facility provided by the coalition unit in charge of the FOB. The mess hall they provide, from what I hear, is a huge upgrade. We are currently coordinating to get Internet access into our personal rooms, and there are many options. Unfortunately they are all barely acceptable and expensive. Oh well, you do what you have to do.

So what's coming up? Well, national elections are fast approaching. We plan on being very, very busy.

Training at Taji

Last week I think we were waiting on a plane ride to Baghdad. Well, the plan arrived and we began our arduous journey north. Actually it was not all that difficult. We flew by C17 from Kuwait to Baghdad International Airport. They packed us into the huge aircraft like sardines. It was truly elbow to elbow with bags stacked everywhere. It was so crowded we were not allowed to get up to use the bathroom in flight. On a positive note, the C17 is a hell of an aircraft. It was a comfortable ride and one could barely feel the landing.

Here's a hint for you future TT deployers: They'll let you have two carry-on's when you leave Kansas, a backpack such as an assault pack plus a laptop bag. They both fit in a wooden box they use a screening. However, The Air Force only lets you have one when you fly from to Baghdad. So make sure your laptop bag, if that's what you plan to use, can hold a bit more than a laptop i.e. about 24 hours of provisions (shave kit, poncho liner, etc). I would suggest a tactical looking laptop backpack and stow the assault pack. Leave Fort Riley with only one bag in hand. The fewer the bags the less the hassle down the road.

From Baghdad, they moved us by helicopter under darkness to Taji. We stacked ourselves and our gear into Chinooks, large dual rotor aircraft, and took off into the darkness. Of course, with helicopters you move with no light and a ton of air flowing through the back so it's always an experience. We waddled off the back of the helicopter and incorporated ourselves into the Phoenix Academy at Taji. Phoenix Academy is where MNC-I trains all the different types of Training Teams coming into Iraq. We are a large class with many different types of teams.

For the most part this is refresher training. Consider it the final cram session before the exam. There are classes on Advising, Security, Arabic, Counterinsurgency, etc... The majority of it is familiar, but most importantly we are getting the information as it relates to what is going on the ground NOW. In case you didn't know, around here, if you left six months ago, you are already obsolete. Timely information is paramount.

National election are coming up rapidly. The new Security Agreement between Iraq and the US is already in effect. The bottom line is things are continuously changing and we have arrived here at a challenging time. Regardless of what you see on the news, or how peaceful you might think things are at the moment, you must always be vigilant, hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. So far, with the personnel we have on our team, I think we have the right combination of optimism tempered by realism and pessimism. That sounds kind of hokey, but we are ready to go. In the next couple of weeks we get through Phoenix Academy and transition with the current team.


Until then.

Waiting on a Plane

We are back at Camp Buerhing after a few days in the field finishing what I would categorize as refresher. Last Thursday, we loaded up and drove out into the Kuwaiti desert with the intention of pulling into a placed called FOB Scimitar, a location set up by the Army and contractors with the purpose of preparing Soldier, Sailors and Marines for life in Iraq. Because of a few missed turns, what was supposed to be a 45-minute drive to the FOB, ended up around 3 hours with a brief visit to the Kuwait/Iraq border. We were a little more than surprised.

For three days, we conducted refresher training. We spent a day at the range doing Close Quarter Marksmanship. It is always a good day when you can shoot for fun. The next day the team executed a scenario-based mission. The range attached to the FOB was a collection of mini-villages packed with role players complete with moving cars and camels. I was taken aback when we hit the first turning circle (in the Middle East, there are few traffic lights, but many turning circles) and the intersection was packed with villagers, livestock and moving vehicles. Up to now, our training has been unable to replicate those conditions.

Of course, as goes, we ran into our worst-case scenario, or what we would call our 'Kobayashi Maru.' We were hit with a vehicle IED, an angry crowd, and multiple additional explosive devices. In the business, we call this a "complex ambush." This is where the enemy lures you in with an initial strike, takes advantage of the chaos and crowds, and follows up with delayed multiple deadly attacks once you pull together to treat your initial wounded. It is another lesson that with only a ten man team, there is only so much you can do short of returning fire, buckling down and running like hell. Overall, it was a great weekend of training put on by the contractors at MPRI.

Now we wait on a plane. We have today to kill before we find out this evening if when we manifest. It could be tonight, could be three days from now. With our team's luck, we will probably draw the 1 hour notice, 1 a.m. bus ride to the airport. If any of you did not know, whenever there is a better or worse probability for mission, travel, or whatever, it seems like our team gets the worse of the two.

To make up for our misfortune, wait, I should not call it misfortune because more often than not it's more inconvenience than actual hardship. To make up for all the inconvenience, we are blessed with an abundance of talent and experience. I will get more into that in the future, but for now, I will end at that. I hope that next time I write I will be at Taji, Iraq undergoing yet more training.

Until next time

Transitioning Through Kuwait

Let's see, where are we these days? Currently the team and I are positioned at Camp Buerhing in Kuwait undergoing additional training prior to moving north into Iraq. So far we've completed engagement skills training, weapon sight verification, a small amout of language. Today we received familiarization training on the new MRAP vehicle. I won't try to spell it out, it's big armored troop vehicle and sits well over 10 feet high. Google for more information if you want to know more about the MRAP.

We're still adjusting to the time and region change. Even after a week in country, we find ourselves waking up at all times of the night for various reasons. Sometimes we fall back asleep, sometimes not. A few of the men in the tent are starting to get sick. The main concern is a bug spreading around. That's what you get when you cram 70 Soldiers in close proximity. At best you stay clean, wash your hands constantly, use lots of sanitizer, and hope for the best.

In around a week we'll head up just north of Baghdad to continue our indoctrination training. We look forward to linking up with the team we will replace and moving to our ultimate destination at FOB O'Ryan. There we will conduct what is called a RIP/TOA, or Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, with the current team to signify our assuming control of the ongoing mission of advising an Iraqi infantry brigade.

With a week of training left here and another 10 or so days of training up north, I think it goes without saying that our team is ready to get the mission underway. We have been training for this assignment since the end of September. Among other things, I think more than anything, the team is lookinig forward to getting a little privacy.

After almost four months of living is rooms full of dudes, we're happy to be moving into a facilities where everyone has their own quarters. They're called CHU's or Container Housing Units; shipping containers converted into portable apartments. They are small but for us they'll be the best thing since sliced bread.

After that we can start to worry about other amenities. I have no idea what kind of communication or internet capability we will have at FOB O'Ryan, but I will make the best whatever is available in order keep everyone informed as we take over the mission.

Until next time.

Weeks 3 & 4 - Language, Cultural Awareness and Counterinsurgency

For the last couple of weeks, we've been knee deep in classroom instruction. The curriculum here for deploying MiTT members starts with a solid foundation of FM 3-24's take on counterinsurgency. Instructors handed out homework in the form of Galula, Kilcullen, and Petraeus. The important thing to note here is that they're not just teaching this to the senior Non-Commissioned Officers and Field Grades, they're are teaching this to everybody. This includes to all enlisted and company grade officers that come through the training.

The goal is to provide every armed forces member deploying as a Training Team (TT) member a rudimentary knowledge of wide variety of considerations in play in their respective Area of Operations (AO), be it Afghanistan or Iraq. I have seen members here from the Army, Air Force, and Navy. While I get a minor chuckle at the cultural differences between services, the bottom line is that they are departing their traditional roles in order to assist the overall mission. Although, it's still funny watching them work their weapon through a clearing barrel.

Probably the most entertaining classes up to now are the Defense Language Institute (DLI) contracted courses in Iraqi-Arabic. They have done an outstanding job in putting together a talented group of individuals that perform the daunting task of teaching an alien language in what seems like an impossibly short time. They also provide invaluable insight in cultural awareness.

As we finish up this phase of our training we looking forward to the tactical phase. Vehicle, weapons, tactics, movement, and other traditional Soldier training awaits. We get in quality physical training in the morning and the food is nothing to complain about. All in all it's been a good couple of weeks as our team appears to have the right combination of leadership, common sense, talent, and experience.

I look forward to getting this mission underway.

Mehdi Army To Stop Carrying Arms?

According to the BBC a spokesperson for cleric Moqtada Sadr, Salah al-Obeidi, said "his militia will no longer carry weapons, but he stopped short of declaring an end to violence." He also stated that resistance would continue if a timetable for U.S. withdrawal was not set.

The general consensus is that the militia has been seriously weakened in the past year by Iraqi and U.S. forces bent on taking them out of the equation. The organization already announced to reorganize back in June to a more political organization.

What would any self-respecting terrorist organization would do when faced with annihilation? Well, join the political process of course. It's a slick move by the militia. By linking disarmament to a U.S. withdrawal, they place pressure on their own government to get a deal done. Whether or not this move by Sadr's militia impact our own stance on negotiations remains to be seen. In the effects business, we call this good IO (Information Operations).

The Bullet Debate: Is Bigger Better?

Since the AP does not have enough to bitch about these days regarding Iraq, they and other news outlets have turned their eyes to they age old debate: Is the 5.56 mm round man enough for the modern battlefield. This is an interesting debate and one that has raged among gun enthusiasts for many, many years.

This all goes back to the 1950s when a bunch of ballistics geniuses decided that "the 7.62 mm round was too powerful for modern service rifles, causing excessive recoil, and that the weight of the ammunition did not allow for enough "firepower" in modern combat." ( Wikipedia). "Firepower" was synonymous with carry-capacity and rate of fire. Simply, a Soldier could should more 5.56 at a higher rate and carry twice as much as opposed to the 7.62.

Giving the 5.56 the lethality edge (at the time) was the round's tendency to yaw and fragment in soft tissue at speeds more than 2,700 ft/s (820 m/s). In layman speak, than means the round is small and fast enough to turn and break apart inside the body.

I can personally testify when this round tumbles, nasty things happen. Up til now the 5.56 had be proudly killing commies and other enemies of the state for over 40 years. What changed? My thesis: shorter barrels and the Internet compromised a round that was a compromise from its inception.

Muzzle velocity (speed) directly correlates to barrel length. The M16 with its 20 inch barrel sported 3,110 ft/s, more than enough to induce the dreaded fragmentation effect. The M4 by comparison with it's 14.5 inch barrel drops the velocity to 2900 ft/s. I am not a firearms expert, but given the high number of reported pass-throughs (where the round goes through the enemy with little or no effect), I contend the decrease make a difference. Not a huge one, mind you, but under the right circumstances to make a difference.

Next point, the Internet. Folks bitched about the 5.56 as long as it's been around. Ask any WWII or Korea vet that hung around for Vietnam what they thought of the 30-06 and 7.62 compared to the 5.56. Well, the Internet gave them a voice. AR-15.com is one of the largest web forums out there. They are vocal and well-read. Their membership includes some of the sharpest ballistics experts in the country. Arguments on bullet size used to be restricted to the club houses of your local shooting range. These experts combined with every-Soldier-a-blogger in combat are making what used to be a rather exclusive private debate among friends into a political issue during an election year.

Enough on the politics, but you get the point. Experts say better aim is the answer, but practical experience dictates that a person inaccurately winged with a 7.62 is more likely to go down that one nicked with a 5.56. Conversely, you better shoot straight with your 7.62 because you can't carry half as much 5.56. Again, it goes back to accuracy.

Other newer rounds are making a case for themselves. Already, Special Operators because of their access to the flexible supply regulations required to get the best Soldiers the best equipment are going downrange with M4 variations based on the 6.8 mm Remington SPC.

From Wikipedia, the 6.8 mm Remington SPC (or 6.8x43mm) is a new rifle cartridge that was developed with collaboration from individual members of US SOCOM. It is midway between the 5.56 and 7.62 in size and velocity with more energy than both. It is particularly adaptable to current 5.56 mm NATO, the cartridge length being relatively equal to the 5.56, the only modification required to the M4 is the upper receiver and barrel. The 6.8 delivers 44% greater energy than the 5.56 mm NATO at 100-200 meters, exactly the type of engagements detracting from the current bullet. The 6.8 does fall short of the 7.62, but maintains the higher carry capacity of the 5.56. (see offset picture, 6.8 on left, 5.56 on right)

The fact that we're having this discussion in public is great. Any discussion that puts better equipment in the hands of Soldiers is fine by me. Personally (if you couldn't already tell), I'm a big fan of the 6.8. Oh, I would also like to see it from a piston-driven AR variant like the FN SCAR, but that is a discussion for another day.

Al-Queda in Iraq admitting defeat?

Probably not in so many words, but they are admitting their difficulties. Courtesy The Two Malcontents, on of Al-Queda's most prolific online supporters posted posted data on on of the premier 'jihadist' websites detailing the steep decline in insurgent operations by 94 percent over the last twelve months. Eighteen months ago, A-Qaeda accounted for 60 percent of Jihadist activity in Iraq. Now they find themselves owning less than 10.

According to the post, the author tallies up and compares the numbers of operations claimed by each insurgent group under four categories: a year and half ago (November 2006), a year ago (May 2007), six months ago (November 2007) and now (May 2008). He demonstrated that while Al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq could claim 334 operations in Nov. 06 and 292 in May 07, their violent output dropped to 25 in Nov. 07 and 16 so far in May 08. Keep in mind that these assessments are based on Al-Qaeda’s own numbers.

Disclaimer, I cannot read Arabic so I rely on the expertise of others. So what is the so-what? AQI is getting pasted and knows it. That one of their own felt necessary to post it (if he is one of theirs) is huge.

Military Seeks Contractors To Train Iraqi Military

From The Washigton Post:

"U.S. commanders in Iraq are for the first time seeking private contractors to form part of the small military teams that train and live with Iraqi military units across the country, according to a notice for prospective bidders published last week.

The solicitation, issued by the Joint Contracting Command in Baghdad, says the individuals that a contractor recruits -- who would include former members of the U.S. Special Forces and ex-Iraqi army officers -- will be trained in the United States with military transition teams (MiTTs) and shipped as a single team to Iraq. The recruits will live on Iraqi military bases "under Iraqi living conditions and participate with operations and convoy duties," the solicitation says."

Since my next assignment is to one of the MiTTs, when a buddy forwarded me this article my career warning light went off like a nuclear bomb. Some of my concerns are selfish, some not so much. Three quick thoughts/concerns:

1. The reality is the military is short on Field Grade officers. We need them in deploying units, we need them in legally mandated non-combat assignments, we need them to help train the Iraqi Defense Force. The Iraqi Army is getting bigger, much bigger so the projected shortage on field grades in MiTT assignments will only grow. There are not enough to go around and you can't grow a Major or Lieutenant Colonel from nothing. I understand that you must fill all three requirements and that the short term answer to that might be contractors but...

2. Contractors are not bound to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This better be on carefully written contract because last time I checked, contractors answer primarily to their employers, not the U.S. Army. Sure, we can fire them or choose not to renew their contract, but as we've seen by the actions of a few select contractors in Iraq, they are not bound by the same ethical standards as Soldiers.

Everyone I have spoken to who has already pull a MiTT assignment has warned me about the troublesome ethical climate when dealing with the Iraqis. There are cultural differences between American uniformed personnel and our Iraqi counterparts. That is not saying they do not love their country or have anything but the best intentions, but there is a certain degree of corruption built into their way of doing business.

It is not usually acceptable to us, but a way of life for them. If not for the ethical standards shown by MiTTs and their U.S. service personnel, the newest version of the IDF would not be much different than the Iraqi Army of old. To place individuals or teams that do no operate under the same ethical framework in such an important role concerns me to say the least.

3. How do I know that MiTTs are important? Because the Army says so. Many smart individuals consider the MiTTs the only true path to our ultimate exit from the war in Iraq. Only through the development of a strong internal defense can we ensure the long term stability of Iraq.

The MiTT Team Chief position is of such importance that it is now considered a "Key Duty" developmental position for Majors alongside Battalion Operations and Executive Officer positions. That means the requirements of the position are so critical and demanding that we will place it on equal footing with traditional power jobs when competing for promotion to battalion command. Now we decide we can contract out the job.

Anyone willing to contract out Battalion Operations or Executive Officer positions? How about a Commander? Yes, I have concerns. Here's to hoping the Army releasing a statement that this is all a figment of the Post's imagination.

Iraqi Officials Beginning to Point Fingers at Iran

I believe Iraqi officials are beginning to realize, perhaps too late, that getting in bed with Iran is not in the best long term interests. Yesterday, The Washington Post published a story citing a source within the Iraqi government saying Sunday that it had "concrete evidence" Iran is fomenting violence in Iraq and that a high-level panel has been formed to document the proof.

The significance here is that it is a named Iraqi official, Ali al-Dabbagh, himself an official government spokesperson, who called reporters late Sunday night to say "There is an interference and evidence that they have interfered in Iraqi affairs." Dabbagh went on to say that the proof was characterized as "concrete evidence."

The Iraqi government is very careful with regards to Iran. Historically, the two never got along. After all, Iraqis are Arabs while the Iranians are Persian. They also fought a rather significant war in recently memory not forgotten by either side. However, with the fall of a strong centralized central government, the Iranian backed Shia were able to make significant inroads into the new Iraqi government.

The Iranian-backed radical cleric al-Sadr was a huge enabler in al-Maliki's move to PM. The support was not just official. Iranian money and support flowed across the borders to the destitute Shia ghettos. The Iraqis government had to choice but to tread lightly when dealing with the issue of Iran's role in the insurgency.

That appears to be changing. This move parallels Maliki's offensive operations against illegal militias and might be oriented at pressuring Iran to cut military its military support.

What good will it do? As we've seen recently, you can have video evidence on the nightly news but the other side will simply call it 'fabricated propaganda.' In the digital age, pictures are no longer worth a thousand words, especially when the target is a country who helps you pay your bills and fight against the 'occupiers.'

International pressure is unlikely as certain members of the U.N. Security Council would never vote for any type of sanction against Iran. The best outcome comes from the knowledge that Iraq itself is looking to hopefully cut ties, at least at the government level, with Iran. No one in the region wants Iran to expand its sphere of influence into Iraq. Perhaps the Iraqis are becoming aware that they are the only ones that can prevent it.

Iraqi Forces Cracking Down on Illegal Militias

The word you do not get on the nightly news is the the Iraqi Army is now effectively engaging the illegal militias in the heart of their own territory, Sadr City. The New York Times wrote that the Iraqi Army supported by US assetts effectively split Sadr City in two. Now what "in two" means I'm not quite sure, but the good news is that the Iraqi forces continue to put the wood to the Mehdi militia.

Counterinsurgency operations continuously evolve. If I have learned a few things over the last year of study, it's that one of the major points of COIN (counterinsurgency) is overwhelming organized armed resistance. I suppose in simple-speak that means having armed independent militias competing with you for the people's affections might be a bad idea. You should just wipe them out, simple. Right?

Wrong, at least up to now. It is difficult to broach the subject of Iraq's tribal underpinnings without writing a dissertation. For some reason all the smart folks at the highest levels of strategic communication have not figured out a great explanation either.

The entities now referred to as "illegal militias" were allowed to exist largely because they were the lesser of two evils when compared to al Quada in Iraq. The militias sprung up largely due in part to the security vacuum after the fall of Baghdad mainly from Shi'a need for self-preservation. In al Sadr the militia had a bona fide spokesperson, not necessarily a shining beacon of reason we all craved, but a negotiable quantity nonetheless.

It is no longer a secret that Iran is providing huge amount of support to the militias in what's becoming their proxy war against the US. (Personally, I believe the relabeling of the Mehdi Militia as an "illegal militia" is a brilliant step.) The militia is doing the smart thing and pushing that support to the people and the people return the love in kind. Given all the Shi'ites serving in the military, police and national leadership (ahem... PM), it is understandable that the Iraqi government was hesitant to put the smack down on the militias.

That appears to be changing as indicated by the firing of over 300 soldiers and police who were unwilling to participate in the crackdown. Though an Iraq with scary-close ties to Iran might be a foregone conclusion, the elimination or at-least mitigation of the illegal militias is a welcome step forward.

Basra Not the Disaster Portrayed in the Media

Following the standoff in Basra last week between Iraqi forces and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi militia, the American media portrayed the resolution of the standoff as a military and political disaster for Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. The four day operation resulted in a supposed cease fire agreement reached between the Iraqi government and an al-Sadr still hiding in Iran. Time magazine declared that the concession amounted to a victory for Sadr; that the Iraqis granted him and his militia some type of legitimacy in the process

GEN Petraeus acknowledged in Ralph Peter's New York Post piece ""the planning for Basra was incomplete and some of the local forces were incapable of standing up to the Iranian-supported rogue-militia elements." I suppose that if you compare their performance to American and British capabilities then their performance might appear lacking. However, reports from the field are that the Iraqi forces went INTO the heart of Basra and fought toe-to-toe with the Mahdi militia, something coalition forces never did.

GEN Petraeus summarized the Iraqi's performance in overcoming their own operational difficulties: "It also displayed the Iraqi capability to deploy two brigades' worth of conventional and special-operations forces on less than 48-hours' notice, with another brigade following. That would not have been possible a year ago."

I should point out that it is being (more accurately) reported now that al-Sadr requested the cease-fire, not the Iraqi government. After all, his force was decisively engaged and facing a now determined Iraqi force bent on securing the vital areas of Basra. If the Mahdi Army fights and gets itself wiped out, Sadr loses a huge chunk of his political leverage.

So were does that leave us today? UPI is reporting that Prime Minister al-Maliki has ordered the complete disbandment of the Mahdi Army. Iraqi Soldiers have continued a theater-wide assault against the entire of al-Sadr's forces. It now seems that the Iraqi government is no longer satisfied with obtaining peace with Sadr, now the Iraqi's appear on the edge of crushing him.

So why aren't we hearing a lot of this on the news? It appears that word is beginning to get out of the region. Fox News appears to be doing their job and echoing the sentiments of Peter's and UPI in preparation of tomorrow's brief to Congress by GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Look for other news agencies and editorials to pick up the beat after the General's sound bytes blanket the news waves.

Of course, while this is potentially tremendous news for the Coalition and its supporters, I can't help but think that it does not sound well for folks that are banking on making a living promising a quick pullout.

GEN Petraeus is a huge fan of T.E. Lawrence, going so far as to quote him in the Army's revolutionary new FM 3.0. Paraphrased, it's better for our local allies to do something imperfectly themselves than for us to do it perfectly for them. Given time, resources, and training and throw in a little patience, the Iraqi Defense Force will overcome. Unfortunately it appears that they may be a little short on time.

The biggest obstacle facing the Iraqi forces is no longer the Mahdi Army or al-Quada, but rather a mounting force of unrealistic expectations.

Milbloggers appearing on PBS' Frontline

Airing 1 April on PBS' Frontline series will be a special focusing on the deployment experiences of a couple of prominent Milblogging.com members. Make sure you mark this on your calendar as I'm sure it will offer an excellent perspective from the ground on a lot of good stories that are not getting back home:

Hi everyone! It`s JP, webmaster of Milblogging.com. As many of you know, I`m a member of Bad Voodoo Platoon and I’m currently deployed in support of OIF. Over the last year, several of us includi ng fellow military blogger Toby Nunn, have been videotaping our experience. Deborah Scranton (The War Tapes) has made a film for FRONTLINE called Bad Voodoo`s War that will be airing on April 1st. The details are below:

BAD VOODOO`S WAR
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
9 P.M. (check local
listings)

In June 2007, as the American military surge reached its peak, a band of National Guard infantrymen who call themselves "The Bad Voodoo Platoon" was deployed to Iraq. To capture a vivid, first-person account of the new realities of war in Iraq for FRONTLINE and ITVS, director Deborah Scranton (The War Tapes) created a "virtual embed" with the platoon, supplying camer as to the soldiers so they could record and tell the story of their war. The film intimately tracks the veteran soldiers of "Bad Voodoo" through the daily grind of their perilous mission, dodging deadly IEDs, grappling with the political complexities of dealing with Iraqi security forces, and battling their fatigue and their fears.

Watch a preview now at: pbs.org/frontline/badvoodoo

Visit the PBS pressroom for press release andphotography.www.pbs.org/pressroom
Online starting April 1.

Keep in mind, if you intend to respond to this e-mail, please write back to me at milblogging@gmail.com (I`m currently in the process of transferring email accounts, but the best place to re ach me for now is milblogging@gmail.com )