Mehdi Army To Stop Carrying Arms?

According to the BBC a spokesperson for cleric Moqtada Sadr, Salah al-Obeidi, said "his militia will no longer carry weapons, but he stopped short of declaring an end to violence." He also stated that resistance would continue if a timetable for U.S. withdrawal was not set.

The general consensus is that the militia has been seriously weakened in the past year by Iraqi and U.S. forces bent on taking them out of the equation. The organization already announced to reorganize back in June to a more political organization.

What would any self-respecting terrorist organization would do when faced with annihilation? Well, join the political process of course. It's a slick move by the militia. By linking disarmament to a U.S. withdrawal, they place pressure on their own government to get a deal done. Whether or not this move by Sadr's militia impact our own stance on negotiations remains to be seen. In the effects business, we call this good IO (Information Operations).

The Bullet Debate: Is Bigger Better?

Since the AP does not have enough to bitch about these days regarding Iraq, they and other news outlets have turned their eyes to they age old debate: Is the 5.56 mm round man enough for the modern battlefield. This is an interesting debate and one that has raged among gun enthusiasts for many, many years.

This all goes back to the 1950s when a bunch of ballistics geniuses decided that "the 7.62 mm round was too powerful for modern service rifles, causing excessive recoil, and that the weight of the ammunition did not allow for enough "firepower" in modern combat." ( Wikipedia). "Firepower" was synonymous with carry-capacity and rate of fire. Simply, a Soldier could should more 5.56 at a higher rate and carry twice as much as opposed to the 7.62.

Giving the 5.56 the lethality edge (at the time) was the round's tendency to yaw and fragment in soft tissue at speeds more than 2,700 ft/s (820 m/s). In layman speak, than means the round is small and fast enough to turn and break apart inside the body.

I can personally testify when this round tumbles, nasty things happen. Up til now the 5.56 had be proudly killing commies and other enemies of the state for over 40 years. What changed? My thesis: shorter barrels and the Internet compromised a round that was a compromise from its inception.

Muzzle velocity (speed) directly correlates to barrel length. The M16 with its 20 inch barrel sported 3,110 ft/s, more than enough to induce the dreaded fragmentation effect. The M4 by comparison with it's 14.5 inch barrel drops the velocity to 2900 ft/s. I am not a firearms expert, but given the high number of reported pass-throughs (where the round goes through the enemy with little or no effect), I contend the decrease make a difference. Not a huge one, mind you, but under the right circumstances to make a difference.

Next point, the Internet. Folks bitched about the 5.56 as long as it's been around. Ask any WWII or Korea vet that hung around for Vietnam what they thought of the 30-06 and 7.62 compared to the 5.56. Well, the Internet gave them a voice. AR-15.com is one of the largest web forums out there. They are vocal and well-read. Their membership includes some of the sharpest ballistics experts in the country. Arguments on bullet size used to be restricted to the club houses of your local shooting range. These experts combined with every-Soldier-a-blogger in combat are making what used to be a rather exclusive private debate among friends into a political issue during an election year.

Enough on the politics, but you get the point. Experts say better aim is the answer, but practical experience dictates that a person inaccurately winged with a 7.62 is more likely to go down that one nicked with a 5.56. Conversely, you better shoot straight with your 7.62 because you can't carry half as much 5.56. Again, it goes back to accuracy.

Other newer rounds are making a case for themselves. Already, Special Operators because of their access to the flexible supply regulations required to get the best Soldiers the best equipment are going downrange with M4 variations based on the 6.8 mm Remington SPC.

From Wikipedia, the 6.8 mm Remington SPC (or 6.8x43mm) is a new rifle cartridge that was developed with collaboration from individual members of US SOCOM. It is midway between the 5.56 and 7.62 in size and velocity with more energy than both. It is particularly adaptable to current 5.56 mm NATO, the cartridge length being relatively equal to the 5.56, the only modification required to the M4 is the upper receiver and barrel. The 6.8 delivers 44% greater energy than the 5.56 mm NATO at 100-200 meters, exactly the type of engagements detracting from the current bullet. The 6.8 does fall short of the 7.62, but maintains the higher carry capacity of the 5.56. (see offset picture, 6.8 on left, 5.56 on right)

The fact that we're having this discussion in public is great. Any discussion that puts better equipment in the hands of Soldiers is fine by me. Personally (if you couldn't already tell), I'm a big fan of the 6.8. Oh, I would also like to see it from a piston-driven AR variant like the FN SCAR, but that is a discussion for another day.

Al-Queda in Iraq admitting defeat?

Probably not in so many words, but they are admitting their difficulties. Courtesy The Two Malcontents, on of Al-Queda's most prolific online supporters posted posted data on on of the premier 'jihadist' websites detailing the steep decline in insurgent operations by 94 percent over the last twelve months. Eighteen months ago, A-Qaeda accounted for 60 percent of Jihadist activity in Iraq. Now they find themselves owning less than 10.

According to the post, the author tallies up and compares the numbers of operations claimed by each insurgent group under four categories: a year and half ago (November 2006), a year ago (May 2007), six months ago (November 2007) and now (May 2008). He demonstrated that while Al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq could claim 334 operations in Nov. 06 and 292 in May 07, their violent output dropped to 25 in Nov. 07 and 16 so far in May 08. Keep in mind that these assessments are based on Al-Qaeda’s own numbers.

Disclaimer, I cannot read Arabic so I rely on the expertise of others. So what is the so-what? AQI is getting pasted and knows it. That one of their own felt necessary to post it (if he is one of theirs) is huge.

Military Seeks Contractors To Train Iraqi Military

From The Washigton Post:

"U.S. commanders in Iraq are for the first time seeking private contractors to form part of the small military teams that train and live with Iraqi military units across the country, according to a notice for prospective bidders published last week.

The solicitation, issued by the Joint Contracting Command in Baghdad, says the individuals that a contractor recruits -- who would include former members of the U.S. Special Forces and ex-Iraqi army officers -- will be trained in the United States with military transition teams (MiTTs) and shipped as a single team to Iraq. The recruits will live on Iraqi military bases "under Iraqi living conditions and participate with operations and convoy duties," the solicitation says."

Since my next assignment is to one of the MiTTs, when a buddy forwarded me this article my career warning light went off like a nuclear bomb. Some of my concerns are selfish, some not so much. Three quick thoughts/concerns:

1. The reality is the military is short on Field Grade officers. We need them in deploying units, we need them in legally mandated non-combat assignments, we need them to help train the Iraqi Defense Force. The Iraqi Army is getting bigger, much bigger so the projected shortage on field grades in MiTT assignments will only grow. There are not enough to go around and you can't grow a Major or Lieutenant Colonel from nothing. I understand that you must fill all three requirements and that the short term answer to that might be contractors but...

2. Contractors are not bound to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This better be on carefully written contract because last time I checked, contractors answer primarily to their employers, not the U.S. Army. Sure, we can fire them or choose not to renew their contract, but as we've seen by the actions of a few select contractors in Iraq, they are not bound by the same ethical standards as Soldiers.

Everyone I have spoken to who has already pull a MiTT assignment has warned me about the troublesome ethical climate when dealing with the Iraqis. There are cultural differences between American uniformed personnel and our Iraqi counterparts. That is not saying they do not love their country or have anything but the best intentions, but there is a certain degree of corruption built into their way of doing business.

It is not usually acceptable to us, but a way of life for them. If not for the ethical standards shown by MiTTs and their U.S. service personnel, the newest version of the IDF would not be much different than the Iraqi Army of old. To place individuals or teams that do no operate under the same ethical framework in such an important role concerns me to say the least.

3. How do I know that MiTTs are important? Because the Army says so. Many smart individuals consider the MiTTs the only true path to our ultimate exit from the war in Iraq. Only through the development of a strong internal defense can we ensure the long term stability of Iraq.

The MiTT Team Chief position is of such importance that it is now considered a "Key Duty" developmental position for Majors alongside Battalion Operations and Executive Officer positions. That means the requirements of the position are so critical and demanding that we will place it on equal footing with traditional power jobs when competing for promotion to battalion command. Now we decide we can contract out the job.

Anyone willing to contract out Battalion Operations or Executive Officer positions? How about a Commander? Yes, I have concerns. Here's to hoping the Army releasing a statement that this is all a figment of the Post's imagination.

Iraqi Officials Beginning to Point Fingers at Iran

I believe Iraqi officials are beginning to realize, perhaps too late, that getting in bed with Iran is not in the best long term interests. Yesterday, The Washington Post published a story citing a source within the Iraqi government saying Sunday that it had "concrete evidence" Iran is fomenting violence in Iraq and that a high-level panel has been formed to document the proof.

The significance here is that it is a named Iraqi official, Ali al-Dabbagh, himself an official government spokesperson, who called reporters late Sunday night to say "There is an interference and evidence that they have interfered in Iraqi affairs." Dabbagh went on to say that the proof was characterized as "concrete evidence."

The Iraqi government is very careful with regards to Iran. Historically, the two never got along. After all, Iraqis are Arabs while the Iranians are Persian. They also fought a rather significant war in recently memory not forgotten by either side. However, with the fall of a strong centralized central government, the Iranian backed Shia were able to make significant inroads into the new Iraqi government.

The Iranian-backed radical cleric al-Sadr was a huge enabler in al-Maliki's move to PM. The support was not just official. Iranian money and support flowed across the borders to the destitute Shia ghettos. The Iraqis government had to choice but to tread lightly when dealing with the issue of Iran's role in the insurgency.

That appears to be changing. This move parallels Maliki's offensive operations against illegal militias and might be oriented at pressuring Iran to cut military its military support.

What good will it do? As we've seen recently, you can have video evidence on the nightly news but the other side will simply call it 'fabricated propaganda.' In the digital age, pictures are no longer worth a thousand words, especially when the target is a country who helps you pay your bills and fight against the 'occupiers.'

International pressure is unlikely as certain members of the U.N. Security Council would never vote for any type of sanction against Iran. The best outcome comes from the knowledge that Iraq itself is looking to hopefully cut ties, at least at the government level, with Iran. No one in the region wants Iran to expand its sphere of influence into Iraq. Perhaps the Iraqis are becoming aware that they are the only ones that can prevent it.

Iraqi Forces Cracking Down on Illegal Militias

The word you do not get on the nightly news is the the Iraqi Army is now effectively engaging the illegal militias in the heart of their own territory, Sadr City. The New York Times wrote that the Iraqi Army supported by US assetts effectively split Sadr City in two. Now what "in two" means I'm not quite sure, but the good news is that the Iraqi forces continue to put the wood to the Mehdi militia.

Counterinsurgency operations continuously evolve. If I have learned a few things over the last year of study, it's that one of the major points of COIN (counterinsurgency) is overwhelming organized armed resistance. I suppose in simple-speak that means having armed independent militias competing with you for the people's affections might be a bad idea. You should just wipe them out, simple. Right?

Wrong, at least up to now. It is difficult to broach the subject of Iraq's tribal underpinnings without writing a dissertation. For some reason all the smart folks at the highest levels of strategic communication have not figured out a great explanation either.

The entities now referred to as "illegal militias" were allowed to exist largely because they were the lesser of two evils when compared to al Quada in Iraq. The militias sprung up largely due in part to the security vacuum after the fall of Baghdad mainly from Shi'a need for self-preservation. In al Sadr the militia had a bona fide spokesperson, not necessarily a shining beacon of reason we all craved, but a negotiable quantity nonetheless.

It is no longer a secret that Iran is providing huge amount of support to the militias in what's becoming their proxy war against the US. (Personally, I believe the relabeling of the Mehdi Militia as an "illegal militia" is a brilliant step.) The militia is doing the smart thing and pushing that support to the people and the people return the love in kind. Given all the Shi'ites serving in the military, police and national leadership (ahem... PM), it is understandable that the Iraqi government was hesitant to put the smack down on the militias.

That appears to be changing as indicated by the firing of over 300 soldiers and police who were unwilling to participate in the crackdown. Though an Iraq with scary-close ties to Iran might be a foregone conclusion, the elimination or at-least mitigation of the illegal militias is a welcome step forward.

Basra Not the Disaster Portrayed in the Media

Following the standoff in Basra last week between Iraqi forces and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi militia, the American media portrayed the resolution of the standoff as a military and political disaster for Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. The four day operation resulted in a supposed cease fire agreement reached between the Iraqi government and an al-Sadr still hiding in Iran. Time magazine declared that the concession amounted to a victory for Sadr; that the Iraqis granted him and his militia some type of legitimacy in the process

GEN Petraeus acknowledged in Ralph Peter's New York Post piece ""the planning for Basra was incomplete and some of the local forces were incapable of standing up to the Iranian-supported rogue-militia elements." I suppose that if you compare their performance to American and British capabilities then their performance might appear lacking. However, reports from the field are that the Iraqi forces went INTO the heart of Basra and fought toe-to-toe with the Mahdi militia, something coalition forces never did.

GEN Petraeus summarized the Iraqi's performance in overcoming their own operational difficulties: "It also displayed the Iraqi capability to deploy two brigades' worth of conventional and special-operations forces on less than 48-hours' notice, with another brigade following. That would not have been possible a year ago."

I should point out that it is being (more accurately) reported now that al-Sadr requested the cease-fire, not the Iraqi government. After all, his force was decisively engaged and facing a now determined Iraqi force bent on securing the vital areas of Basra. If the Mahdi Army fights and gets itself wiped out, Sadr loses a huge chunk of his political leverage.

So were does that leave us today? UPI is reporting that Prime Minister al-Maliki has ordered the complete disbandment of the Mahdi Army. Iraqi Soldiers have continued a theater-wide assault against the entire of al-Sadr's forces. It now seems that the Iraqi government is no longer satisfied with obtaining peace with Sadr, now the Iraqi's appear on the edge of crushing him.

So why aren't we hearing a lot of this on the news? It appears that word is beginning to get out of the region. Fox News appears to be doing their job and echoing the sentiments of Peter's and UPI in preparation of tomorrow's brief to Congress by GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Look for other news agencies and editorials to pick up the beat after the General's sound bytes blanket the news waves.

Of course, while this is potentially tremendous news for the Coalition and its supporters, I can't help but think that it does not sound well for folks that are banking on making a living promising a quick pullout.

GEN Petraeus is a huge fan of T.E. Lawrence, going so far as to quote him in the Army's revolutionary new FM 3.0. Paraphrased, it's better for our local allies to do something imperfectly themselves than for us to do it perfectly for them. Given time, resources, and training and throw in a little patience, the Iraqi Defense Force will overcome. Unfortunately it appears that they may be a little short on time.

The biggest obstacle facing the Iraqi forces is no longer the Mahdi Army or al-Quada, but rather a mounting force of unrealistic expectations.

Milbloggers appearing on PBS' Frontline

Airing 1 April on PBS' Frontline series will be a special focusing on the deployment experiences of a couple of prominent Milblogging.com members. Make sure you mark this on your calendar as I'm sure it will offer an excellent perspective from the ground on a lot of good stories that are not getting back home:

Hi everyone! It`s JP, webmaster of Milblogging.com. As many of you know, I`m a member of Bad Voodoo Platoon and I’m currently deployed in support of OIF. Over the last year, several of us includi ng fellow military blogger Toby Nunn, have been videotaping our experience. Deborah Scranton (The War Tapes) has made a film for FRONTLINE called Bad Voodoo`s War that will be airing on April 1st. The details are below:

BAD VOODOO`S WAR
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
9 P.M. (check local
listings)

In June 2007, as the American military surge reached its peak, a band of National Guard infantrymen who call themselves "The Bad Voodoo Platoon" was deployed to Iraq. To capture a vivid, first-person account of the new realities of war in Iraq for FRONTLINE and ITVS, director Deborah Scranton (The War Tapes) created a "virtual embed" with the platoon, supplying camer as to the soldiers so they could record and tell the story of their war. The film intimately tracks the veteran soldiers of "Bad Voodoo" through the daily grind of their perilous mission, dodging deadly IEDs, grappling with the political complexities of dealing with Iraqi security forces, and battling their fatigue and their fears.

Watch a preview now at: pbs.org/frontline/badvoodoo

Visit the PBS pressroom for press release andphotography.www.pbs.org/pressroom
Online starting April 1.

Keep in mind, if you intend to respond to this e-mail, please write back to me at milblogging@gmail.com (I`m currently in the process of transferring email accounts, but the best place to re ach me for now is milblogging@gmail.com )